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http://www.hackerschool.org/HS_Boards/zboard.php?id=HS_Translate&no=13 []


so basically, You're saying that, I'm saying that
when an application is in design stage
⺻ α׷ ܰ迡 ,

or when you are about to do threat analysis hopefully this is still in design stage.
Ȥ м Ϸ , ٶǵ ̰͵ ܰԴϴ.

you should have full knowledge of this background
˾ƾ߸ մϴ.

or at least as mush knowledge as possible
Ȥ ˾ƾ մϴ.

and there're too much knowlodges also handful so you know
אl ʹ ĵ ֽϴ.

you want to have as much knowledge as a from a security perspective focus
ð մϴ.

sit with the developers, talk to them, get the knowledge
** them
ڵ Բ ɾƼ ȭ ϰ, .

decompose application
α׷ ϱ

so break the application into major chunks
α׷ ߿ κе ɰϴ.

you can either break it to indivisual component type
װ Ʈ · ɰ ֽϴ.

by the entry point, trust point
entry point trust post Դϴ.

you can break into application architecture level itself
׸ α׷ Ű ɰ ֽϴ.

uh.. what is an application architecture?
α׷ ŰĶ?

authentication, authorization, session management,
, 㰡, ...

you break the application into these specific areas
ok
ó α׷ Ư ֽϴ.

once you have this specific area
ó Ư ,

you can isolatate them and you can focus *** problem or **** perspective
װ͵  ְ, *** Ȥ *** ֽϴ.

you can say ok this person is good at authentication stuff
׸ ' '

so and crypto stuff
'׸ ȣ ' ̷ ֽϴ.

so lets get him going* in that authentication in crypto level
ȣ ʿ Ҵ ŵϴ.

you can seperate it and you have actual physical seperation of reviewing code
̷ ְ, ڵ ˴ϴ.

right now what happens typically is they hire ten people review the code
ڵ 並 10 ؼ

everybody is reviewing it's pretty bizarre
ΰ 並 ð մϴ. Ưմϴϴ.

if you actually break down into separate chunks it might became easier
ϴ.

the other matter that you can do is break in into indivisual components
ٸ Ʈ Դϴ.

identify all entry point the network accessible, locally accessible
entry point, Ʈũ , Ȯմϴ.

and identify the trust levels
׸ trust level Ȯմϴ.

this is typically what microsoft recommends
̰ MS õϴ ̱⵵ մϴ.

so modeling the ar... modeling system itself
׷ ý ü 𵨸մϴ.

this is the third level
̰ ° ܰԴϴ.

you can either do at third process stage
° μ ܰ迡 ص Ǹ,

you can either draw dataflow diagrams
dataflow ̾׷ ׷ ˴ϴ.

what is the dataflow diagrams?
dataflow ̾׷̶?

it's just a graphical representation of your entire data
ü ͸ ׷ ǥ Դϴ.

how it's flowing from start to finish
ۿ  귯..

I'm sure all of you know uh.. the details of dataflow diagrams ****
dataflow ̾׷ ؼ ˰ Ŷ մϴ.

and then do a detailed analysis of a determined threats
м ϴ.

this is the part where, again it's the single biggest challenge in my mind
κ մϴ.

you have to figure out what the possbility dangers are to the application
α׷ ߻ ִ 輺 ˾Ƴ մϴ.

so far we have not touch the code
ڵ带 ʾҽϴ.

we are still thinking from threat analsysis point of view
츮 м ֽϴ.

i just want to keep that.. keep that in your mind right now
Ͻñ ٶϴ.

and figure out what is vulnerabilty?
׸ ˾ƾ մϴ.

vulnerabilty is when a thread is susceptible to in an attack
, װ ̶ մϴ.

it is not *** attack, but it could be an attack
ok
*** ƴ, ֽϴ.

something might be a threat but it might not a vulnerability
ֽϴ.

but every vulnerablity has to be a threat
׷ ˴ϴ.

it's a unmitigated threat
Դϴ.

it's what a vulnerabilty is
̰ ٷ Դϴ.

and if few have not thought of the threat before hand it,
׸ ̸̸ ʴ´ٸ,

it is likely that it would turn into a vulnerability
װ ߿ ֽϴ.

because you have obviously not level confirmations to accepts*
ܰ Ȯϰ Ǿ ʱ Դϴ.

so here are couple of definitions
 ǰ ֽϴ.

which are dictionary.com and writing secure code
dictionary.com writing secure code Դϴ.

talk about different between threats, risks, and vulnerabilities
, , ϰ ֽϴ.

so, basically threat is a malicious entity that might try to attack
⺻ ̶ õϴ ü մϴ.

I think I made some mistakes over there.. a malicious
( Ǽ Ѱ ׿ a malicious)

a threat does not constitute vulnerablity
ʽϴ.

and basically is something that could be exploited but we dont have information about it
ok?
׸ exploit , װͿ ƹ Դϴ.

risks, something might go wrong
Ҷ, ߸Ǿ ִٴ ǹմϴ.

and finally, vulnerability is definitly there is a weakness which has or has not yet been exploited
ok
׸ ̶, ְ, ̹ exploit Ǿų exploit մϴ.

assigning values all the theats that you bigger doubt
ǽɽ ġ οմϴ.

this is the second most important part of thread analysis
̹ м ־ ι° ߿ Դϴ.

a pre-source code review
ٷ ҽ ڵ Դϴ.

so microsoft came out with the standard DREAD model you know
ƽôٽ, MS ǥ DREAD ߽ϴ.

figure out damage reproduce simplity, exploitablity and assigned number between one to ten
um...
ϰ, exploit ɼ 1 10 ڷ մϴ.

when I used to teach class of writing secure code or source code reviews
write secure code̳ source code review ,

we use go under DREAD modeling and everyone used to ask me this question
츮 DREAD 𵨸 ϰ, ΰ ̷ մϴ.

which I had a lot of difficulty answering
̿ 亯 ϱⰡ ƽϴ.

how do you assign of value to damage to potential or any of these between one and ten?
ɼ̳ ̷ 1 10 ڵ  Ҵ?

how figure it out, is there a standard?
 װ ˱? ǥ ֳ?

and unfortunatly there is information about it
ƽԵ ̿ ϴ.

but it's pretty much pulling it out of your behind
ϴ ͺ ֽϴ.



ȴ κ ؿܿ ϰ ִ ¯ z0nkԾư ־ϴ.
ؼ ... ؼԴϴ..


  Hit : 1743     Date : 2011/05/09 04:49



    
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5   ̹ ۾(nish_bhalla_auditing_source_code) ̿.     W.H.
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